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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A
LIMIT ON ALIEN LAND LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
As the real estate industry has gradually globalized, for-
eign ownership in United States real estate has dramatically
increased.' Foreign investors seeking a safe haven for their
capital find the United States real estate market particularly
attractive.2 This increase in foreign investment in United
States real estate has attracted public attention and raised
concern about the consequences. It was this concern that
prompted Congress to undertake a number of studies to inves-
tigate the situation.' The reaction by some of the states to the
increase in foreign investment has not been as restrained.
While state laws restricting foreign ownership of real property
have existed continually throughout our history,4 the dramatic
increase in foreign investment in the 1970s and 1980s prompt-
ed a number of states to tighten their restrictions.5 Over the
years, states have enacted a wide variety of laws regulating
alien ownership of real property. It may be helpful if, at the
outset, the general nature of these laws are described. The
1. From 1981 to 1989 foreign investment in U.S. commercial real estate
increased fourfold and stood at $35.85 billion in 1989. Yet this represents only 2%
of the total value of U.S. commercial property in 1988. See U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMm. ON OVERSIGHT AND IN-
VESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONCERNS IN THE U.S. REAL ESTATE SECTOR DURING THE
1980s 2 (1991).
Foreign investors own only slightly more than 1% of U.S. agricultural land
as of 1990. This percentage level has remained relatively steady from 1981
through 1990. See J. PETER DEBRAAL, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE REPORT, FOR-
EIGN OWNERSHIP OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL LAND THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1990 viii.
2. This is due to numerous factors: (1) the stability of the government; (2)
the size of the market and number of opportunities; (3) the tendency for the prop-
erty to appreciate in value faster than the inflation rate; (4) relatively lower prices
in terms of foreign currency in periods when the dollar is in decline; and (5) the
developed capital market with relatively low interest rates. See Stephen E. Roulac,
Advising Foreign Investors in U.S. Real Estate, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 108, 109-12
(1980).
3. See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
5. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
76-402, 76-414 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West Supp. 1989).
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laws can be divided into statutes that: (1) restrict ownership by
foreign individuals; (2) distinguish between resident and non-
resident aliens; (3) restrict ownership by foreign corporations;
(4) affect foreign ownership through the laws of inheritance; (5)
place limits on the number of acres that can be owned; (6)
place limits on the value (in dollars) of the property holding;
(7) place limits on the period of time the land may be held; (8)
distinguish between urban land and agricultural land; and
finally (9) distinguish between public6 and privately owned
land.!
Because of the wide variety of possible restrictions, no two
states have enacted identical laws. Some commentators have
argued that this patchwork of state laws creates a barrier of
confusion to many investors.' Others have argued that many
of the state laws are easily circumvented and should be re-
placed by federal legislation? Still others have argued that, no
matter what effect these laws may have, "control over alien
land ownership is an inherent state power, and any attempt to
supplant this power must overcome the strong presumption of
exclusive state control."10
This Note will examine the constitutionality of alien land
laws under the dormant commerce clause." Alien land laws
raise numerous other constitutional issues including: foreign
relation power, 2 pre-emption,1 equal protection, 4 and su-
6. The statutes use the term "public" land to refer to land that is being sold
by a governmental entity.
7. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text discussing the nature of
current alien land laws in the United States. See also Charles H. Sullivan, Alien
Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15, 16-26 (1962) (Professor Sullivan
was one of the first authors to classify states according to the nature of their
alien land laws); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION-COMMITPEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN U.S. REAL ESTATE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE, A COMPREHEN-
SIVE GUIDE, 69-112 (Timothy E. Powers ed., 1990) (providing a relatively complete
list of the current U.S. alien land laws) [hereinafter COMP REHENSIVE GUIDE].
8. See generally Andrew J. Starrels, A Proposal for Uniform Regulation of
Foreign Investment in American Real Estate, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147 (1985).
9. See generally Ronald L. Bell & Jonathan D. Savage, Our Land is Your
Land. Ineffective State Restriction of Alien Land Ownership and the Need for Fed-
eral Legislation, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 679 (1980).
10. James A. Frechter, Alien Landownership in the United States: A Matter of
State Control, 14 BROOK. J. INTL L. 147, 148-49 (1988).
11. See infra notes 145-239 (discussing the dormant commerce clause).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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premacy. 5 These issues will be discussed only to the extent
necessary to show that the constitutional limitations they pose
have little effect on the alien land laws currently in place and
thus illustrate the importance of the dormant commerce clause
as a potential limit to state power in this area.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the history of
alien land laws and the constitutional challenges these laws
have faced in the past. Part II examines the nature of the state
and federal governments' power to regulate land ownership. It
first points out that, while the states have broad power to
regulate land ownership, there are constitutional limits to this
power. It also discusses the current federal regulations govern-
ing foreign investment in real property and argues that the
federal laws do not pre-empt the state laws in this area. Part
III begins by providing the constitutional framework the Su-
preme Court has constructed to analyze state laws that burden
interstate and foreign commerce. This Note will then argue, as
a threshold matter, that foreign investment in United States
real estate is properly analyzed under the dormant commerce
clause. Finally, the Note will argue that the facially discrimi-
natory nature of alien land laws renders them invalid under
the dormant commerce clause test the Supreme Court has
adopted.
It is important to clarify what this Note will not address.
It is not the aim of this Note to pass judgment on the policy
issues involved with alien land laws. Specifically, it will not
attempt to determine whether the diverse needs of the several
states are best served by regulations made at the local level, or
whether the country would be better served by uniform federal
regulations. 6 Nor will it address the question of whether
state restrictions on foreign ownership of land unwisely inter-
fere with the federal government's ability to formulate and
carry out a national economic policy with respect to foreign
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The following articles have attempted a comprehensive constitutional analy-
sis of alien land laws: Fred L. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in Amer-
ican Real Estate, 60 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1976); William B. Fisch, State Regulation
of Alien Land Ownership, 43 MO. L. REV. 407 (1978); Bell & Savage, supra note
9; Frechter, supra note 10.
16. For two opposing views, see Frechter, supra note 10 (arguing that real
property law should be an exclusive state function); Starrels, supra note 8 (arguing
that the states should adopt a uniform national standard).
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investment in the United States. This Note will also not at-
tempt a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions with
respect to the dormant commerce clause.7 The approach this
Note will take is to analyze and synthesize primarily Supreme
Court Commerce Clause decisions, accepting the Court's rea-
soning at face value, and applying the Court's reasoning to
state laws that restrict foreign ownership of land.
II. HISTORY OF ALIEN LAND LAWS
The present state of alien land laws can best be under-
stood after a brief discussion of their history. The law of real
property in the United States is derived from English feudal
law, which was designed to secure allegiance to the crown
through military service. 8 This system did not lend itself to
alien land ownership and thus aliens were not permitted to
own land. 9 Later English law permitted aliens to take real
property by purchase, but not by inheritance. ° This system
remained the law until 1870 when it was abolished by statute
and aliens were granted full property rights.2'
Early American colonies adopted the English common law
and excluded aliens from land ownership.2 However, begin-
ning with the United States independence and extending to
the late nineteenth century, there was a "uniform tendency
toward dilution or abolition of the common law exclusion of
alien" land ownership through legislation and judicial interpre-
tation." The abolitionist trend slowed during the late 1800s
when the first wave of alien land laws swept over the nation.
Congress passed the Territorial Land Act of 1887,24 which
forbade extensive alien landholding in the organized territo-
ries, except by immigrant farmers who had applied for citizen-
17. For a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause
decisions, see generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection-
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986) (arguing that in dormant commerce clause cases the Court should only be
concerned with preventing economic protectionism).
18. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 623.
19. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 623.
20. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 623.
21. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 623.
22. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 623.
23. Morrison, supra note 15, at 624.
24. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1988). Note that this law is presently of little sig-
nificance because the territories have been organized into states.
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ship. This federal law was enacted in response to fears of large
European-type landlords, the potential for large foreign- owned
ranches to jeopardize statehood for the territories, and the
perceived danger of becoming an economic colony of Great Brit-
ain." Eleven states passed similar laws.2' The state laws
were seen as a necessary response to a depressed agricultural
condition and a "guard against the [perceived] danger of absen-
tee ownership of farm land."27
A second wave of alien land laws was prompted by a grow-
ing anti-Japanese sentiment in the early 1900s. Japanese
immigrant farmers in California, Oregon and Washington were
subjected to racial prejudice and accusations of unfair competi-
tion.28 Legislatures in Pacific coast states and as far east as
Kansas passed laws prohibiting alien "Orientals" from owning
land.29 "These laws were commonly framed to exclude from
land ownership 'aliens ineligible for citizenship.' Since
"Orientals" were the only racial class excluded from citizenship
by federal immigration laws, the practical effect was immedi-
ate. 30
In 1923 the Supreme Court held that these discriminatory
laws did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause31 or
the Due Process Clause. After World War II, however, there
was a distinct trend to repeal discriminatory alien land laws.
Dicta in two Supreme Court decisions indicated that discrimi-
natory alien land laws directed at Japanese aliens were vul-
nerable to attack on equal protection grounds.3 Challenges to
these laws never reached the Supreme Court. Most states,
25. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 625.
26. Colorado, Illinois, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Texas and Wisconsin. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 30-31 & n.68.
27. See James A. Huizinga, Note, Alien Land Laws: Constitutional Limitations
on State Power to Regulate, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 251 & n.4 (citing Afiderson, A Sur-
vey of Alien Land Investment in U.S. Colonial Times to Present, 8 U.S. DEPT OF
COMMERCE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN U.S. L-2).
28. See Huizinga, supra note 27, at 252.
29. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 626.
30. Morrison, supra note 15, at 626-27.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197,
216-19 (1923). See also Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Frick v. Webb,
263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923).
33. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 425 (1948);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring);
id. at 650 (Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., concurring).
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recognizing that the laws were potentially unconstitutional and
racially motivated, either repealed' or judicially invalidated
the laws.35 Other legislation lost its significance with the 1952
amendment of the federal immigration law.36
A third wave of alien land laws sprang up during the Cold
War. Many states passed legislation that limited the rights of
foreigners to receive land by inheritance." The laws were de-
signed to prevent the diversion of American wealth to commu-
nist totalitarian governments rather than to prevent land own-
ership by aliens." However, in Zschernig v. Miller,39 the Su-
preme Court severely limited this practice when it struck down
an Oregon statute that conditioned a foreign citizen's right of
inheritance on a showing of reciprocal rights granted to United
States citizens by the alien's country. The Court held that the
law was an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into the
field of foreign affairs.4°
The most recent wave of legislation occurred in the 1970s.
A number of states reacted to a surge in foreign investment in
farmland by restricting the situs and amount of land that
could be purchased.4 The new legislation also appears to
have been due to an emotional response to media reports about
the increased foreign direct investment in the United States.
The reports tended to generate xenophobia, causing a negative
attitude toward foreign investment in general,43 in addition to
34. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 627-28.
35. See, e.g., Fuji v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952); State v. Oakland, 287
P.2d 39 (Mont. 1955); Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569 (Or. 1949).
36. The amendment eliminated the last remaining class of aliens ineligible for
citizenship. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1988)).
37. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 628.
38. See generally Harold J. Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 257 (1962); William B. Wong, Comment, Iron Curtain Statutes,
Communist China, and the Right to Devise, 32 UCLA L. REv. 643 (1985).
39. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
40. Id. at 432. State courts, in searching for reciprocity under these statutes,
conducted detailed examinations of foreign states' policies, often passing judgment
on foreign governments' practices. See, e.g., In re Belemecich's Estate, 192 A.2d
740 (Pa. 1963).
41. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
76-402, 76-414 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West Supp. 1989).
42. See, e.g., Nancy Yoshihara & Roger Smith, Real Estate A Big Draw for
Foreigners, L-. TIMES, May 31, 1978, at part 1, 1; The Selling of America, TIME,
May 29, 1978, at 71; Robert Lindsey, Foreign Investors Rush to Aquire U.S. Prop-
erty as Haven for Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1978, at Al.
43. Steve Frazier, National Sentiment Against Land Holding of Foreigners
222 [Vol. XX: I
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increasing the perception that United States family farmers
were threatened."
Today, almost half of the states have laws that, to varying
degrees, restrict the rights of aliens to own real property.45
These laws range from complete prohibitions46 to simple re-
porting requirements. The vast majority of the laws apply
only to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.4" How-
ever, six states still restrict resident aliens to varying de-
grees.49 The most prohibitive restrictions involve the acquisi-
tion of agricultural land by nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations. A number of states have enacted laws that, aside
from a few exceptions, completely prohibit ownership of agri-
cultural land by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations."
Other states5' have enacted reporting requirements that par-
allel the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of
1978 (AFIDA)5 or have limited the number of acres of agri-
cultural land that can be owned. 3 Restrictions on non-agricul-
Strikes Chord in Oklahoma, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1980, at 13.
44. See Huizinga, supra note 27, at 253.
45. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 73-133 (providing a relatively
complete list of alien land laws).
46. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West Supp. 1989).
47. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.24 (Michie 1993).
48. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(b) (1983); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-3-102-10
(Michie 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West Supp. 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.300(1) (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.221 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972 & Supp. 1988); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 442.571 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-214, -306 (1989);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (1983) (see also In re Estate of Constan, 384 A.2d
495 (N.H. 1978)); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3, 64-4 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-
10.1-01, 02 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.254 (Anderson 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§§ 41-47 (Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-2A-1, -6 (1983 & Supp.
1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.24 (Michie 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West
Supp. 1989).
49. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, paras. 1, 2 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-8-2, 32-7-1-3 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1989); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-404-414 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 517.010
(1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990); S.C.
CONST. art. 3, § 35; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-31-10, -30 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
50. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
442.571 (Vernon 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-10.1-01, -02 (Supp. 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
51. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-102, -110 (Michie 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5,
paras. 601-608 (Smith-Hurd 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.24 (Michie 1983).
52. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1983). See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text for a discussion of AFIDA.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 41-47 (Purdon Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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tural real property include: complete prohibitions,' limits on
the number of acres that can be owned,55 limits on the num-
ber of years the property may be held for,56 and reporting
requirements. Additionally, a number of states still have
laws that affect the right of aliens to receive testamentary
dispositions. 8
III. THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS' CONCURRENT
POWER TO REGULATE LAND OWNERSHIP
A. States' Power and Limitations
Most Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the states'
power to regulate land ownership have concerned challenges to
state laws regarding testamentary transfers of real property. 9
The holdings indicate that the state's power to control the
disposition of property within their borders is a deeply rooted
tradition. In 1825, the Supreme Court in McCormick v.
Sullivant,60 stated that "[iut is an acknowledged principle of
law that the title and disposition of real property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country where it is situated, which
can alone prescribe the mode by which a title to it can pass
from one person to another."5 ' In United States v. Fox,62 fifty
years later, the Court stated that "[t]he power of the state to
regulate the tenure of real property within her limits, and the
modes of its acquisition and transfer.., is undoubted." 3 In
ANN. §§ 43-2A-1, -6 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
54. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972 & Supp. 1988).
55. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-2 (Burns 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 710.02
(West Supp. 1989).
56. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, para. 1, 2 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1989); KY.
REV. STAT.. ANN. § 381.300(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1988).
57. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.254 (Anderson 1989).
58. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-214, -306 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 477:20 (1938); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3, 64-4 (1987); see also In re Estate
of Constan, 384 A.2d 495 (N.H. 1978) (prohibiting nonresident aliens from inherit-
ing property).
59. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
60. 23 U.S. 192 (1825).
61. Id. at 202 (case concerns a dispute about the ownership of land that was
the subject of a testamentary disposition).
62. 94 U.S. 315 (1876).
63. Id. at 320. This case involved a question of whether New York had the
power to prohibit a testamentary disposition of real property to the United States
government. The Court held that it is within the states' power to regulate who
may be the beneficiary of a testamentary gift of real property. Id.
224 [Vol. XX: I
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United States v. Burnison,' the Court upheld Fox, stating
that the Tenth Amendment" ensured the states' "power to
determine the manner of testamentary transfer of a
domiciliary's property and the power to determine who may be
made beneficiaries."66 Thus, one could argue that these deci-
sions create a presumption of state control in this area.
However, states are not as free to regulate land transfers
and ownership as these holdings might indicate. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the states' power to regulate
land ownership is directly and indirectly limited by the Consti-
64. 339 U.S. 87 (1950) (case involved the same facts as Fox except the state
involved was California).
65. The Tenth Amendment provides that "It]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the State, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. Y. Early interpre-
tation of the Tenth Amendment held that regulation of purely intrastate activities
was reserved to the states and hence any federal regulation in these areas was
beyond the commerce power. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895) (regulation of manufacturing is an exclusive state function); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (regulation of the labor conditions in production is
an exclusive state function).
However, the Court has since completely discarded that interpretation. In
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court held that the "[Tenth
A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that . . . its pur-
pose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek
to exercise powers not granted . . . ." Id. at 124. The Court concluded that the
Tenth Amendment does not deprive the "national government of authority to re-
sort to all means for the exercise of granted powers which are appropriate and
plainly adopted to the permitted end." Id. The Court has thus allowed the federal
government to regulate areas traditionally controlled by the states. See United
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (Court rejects Tenth Amendment challenge
to federal law that conflicts with state escheat laws). In 1976, however, the Court
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), held that the Tenth
Amendment prohibited the federal government from regulating in any way that
would impair the states' ability to perform their "traditional governmental func-
tions." Id. at 852. Thus, the Court found that the Tenth Amendment prevented
the Congress from extending the federal minimum wage and maximum hours
standards to cover employees of state and local governments. Id. at 851-52. In the
cases following Usery the Court found it very difficult to distinguish those func-
tions which are traditional governmental functions from those that are not. See
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). Finally, in 1985, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), expressly overruled Usery, holding
that Congress has the power pusuant to the Commerce Clause to apply commer-
cial regulations to the state and local governments and that state sovereignty is
adequately protected by the "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system." Id. at 552.
66. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 92 (1950).
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tution. It is generally understood that the Equal Protection
Clause is a direct limitation on the state's power to enact laws
that discriminate against resident alien land ownership. In
Oyama v. California,67 the Supreme Court, for all practical
purposes, overruled Terrace v. Thompson" by indicating in
dictum that the California law, which prohibited aliens inel-
igible for citizenship from owning land, was unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds. 9 However, very few states cur-
rently impose restrictions on resident alien land ownership.7 °
The state laws that do are certainly susceptible to a constitu-
tional challenge on equal protection grounds. The vast majority
of current alien land laws restrict only nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations.7' It is unclear whether these laws are
equally susceptible to a constitutional challenge on equal pro-
tection grounds. Other authors have discussed this issue in
detail and come up with conflicting conclusions.72 The argu-
ments of these authors will not be restated here. Though it is
worth noting that in Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,73 the
only recent case to address this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that a Wisconsin law that restricted nonresident
aliens from owning more than 640 acres of land did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.74 The state argued that absentee
ownership of land by nonresident aliens can be detrimental to
the welfare of the community where the land is located.75 The
court, applying a low level of scrutiny, held that "[t]his ratio-
67. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
68. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text,
69. Terrace was not completely overturned because only four of the Justices
comprising the majority would have held the statutory classification race-based,
and therefore unconstitutional on its face. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
650. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72. See Andrew W. Wilson, Note, State Laws Restricting Land Purchases by
Aliens: Some Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
135, 147-49 (1982) (arguing that the Court should not distinguish between resident
and nonresident aliens and apply a strict scrutiny standard to alien land laws
that restrict the rights of either class). Cf. Frechter, supra note 10, at 171 (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court has never actually restricted the states' power to
enact alien land laws based on equal protection even though they have had the
opportunity to do so).
73. 246 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1976).
74. Id. at 825.
75. Id.
226 [Vol. XX: I
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nale is not so 'patently arbitrary' as to require us to reject
it."76 In arriving at its decision to apply a low level of scruti-
ny, the court distinguished the Wisconsin law, which only
applied to nonresident aliens, from state laws which discrimi-
nate against all aliens.77 It found that the Supreme Court's
reasons for applying a heightened level of scrutiny where resi-
dent aliens were concerned are absent where nonresident
aliens are concerned." In brief, the Wisconsin court reasoned,
first, that it is the class of resident aliens that are similarly
situated to citizens who are protected and not aliens world-
wide, and therefore, a lower level of scrutiny is justified for
laws that only discriminate against nonresident aliens.79 Sec-
ond, unlike the state laws that the Supreme Court has struck
down using a heightened level of scrutiny-laws which limited
resident alien's right to works or receive other public
benefits81-the Wisconsin law only restricted the investment
opportunity for nonresident aliens." Therefore, the court rea-
soned that the Wisconsin law did not conflict with the federal
government's immigration policy to admit aliens into the coun-
try.' The Wisconsin court further justified its use of a lower
76. Id.
77. Id. at 820-21.
78. Id. at 821.
79. Citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Wisconsin court
argued that resident aliens, like citizens, equally bear the burdens of society such
as paying taxes and serving in the military. Additionally, resident aliens, like
citizens, may be long-standing members of the community and contributors to the
welfare of the state where they reside. Therefore, it would be unfair to withhold
some of society's benefits from one of these two similarly situated groups when
they bear society's burdens equally. Thus, laws that distinguish between the two
classes receive heightened scrutiny. Id.
80. The Court cited to Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (Court struck down
an Arizona law which required most employers to hire 80% qualified electors or
native born citizens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (Court struck
down a New York statute that disqualified aliens from competitive civil service
jobs); In re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Court struck down a Connecticut law
that excluded aliens from the practice of law); Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,
246 N.W.2d 815, 821-22 (Wis. 1976).
81. The Court cited Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), where the
Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law that conditioned the receipt of welfare
benefits on longtime residency or citzenship. 246 N.W.2d at 821.
82. 246 N.W.2d at 822.
83. The Supreme Court has reasoned that state laws that interfere with the
right to work or receive public benefits conflict with the federal governmenfs im-
migration policy because a state is depriving resident aliens of a privilege that the
federal government has conferred by admission into the country. See Graham v.
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level of scrutiny by falling back on the states' traditional power
concerning land use and the history of state regulation of alien
land ownership.' Suffice it to say that there is a good chance
that alien land laws that restrict only nonresident aliens would
withstand an equal protection challenge if the Supreme Court
were to address the issue.
The Court has also identified two indirect constitutional
limitations on the states' power to regulate alien land owner-
ship. The first is the federal government's exclusive power over
foreign affairs. 5 The negative implication of the affirmative
grant of power over foreign affairs to the federal government is
that states may not enact laws that intrude in this area. 6 As
discussed earlier, 7 in Zschernig v. Miller,"8 the Supreme
Court struck down an Oregon statute that prohibited nonresi-
dent aliens from inheriting property unless the foreigners' own
country granted United States citizens the right to inherit
property under their laws. The Court found the statute uncon-
stitutional because it "impair[ed] the effective exercise of the
Nation's foreign policy" 9 and thus constituted an unlawful
intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs.
However, the vast majority of current alien land laws are
not likely to be significantly affected by the Court's holding in
Zschernig. Only four states have reciprocity statutes similar to
the one in Zschernig.0 Case law in these states has followed
the holding in Zschernig and thus limited the effect of these
statutes." The remainder of the states' alien land laws do not
contain reciprocity provisions or any other provisions that
would require the state courts to inquire into the policies of
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376; Takahashi Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,
420 (1947). The Wisconsin court argued that federal immigration policy is not
implicated when a state law merely limits the scope of the investment opportuni-
ties open to nonresident aliens. 246 N.W.2d at 822.
84. 246 N.W.2d at 822-24.
85. See infra note 106.
86. Additionally, the Constitution expressly prohibits states from entering into
agreements or compacts with foreign countries. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
87. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
88. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
89. Id. at 440.
90. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-214 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 4-107 (1987),
30-2312 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-3 (1987); WYO. STAT. § 34-15-101 (Supp.
1989).
91. See, e.g., Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968).
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foreign governments as was the case with the statute at issue
in Zschernig.
The second indirect constitutional limitation on the states'
power to enact alien land laws that the Court has identified is
the Supremacy Clause92 with respect to United States trea-
ties. Under the Supremacy Clause, valid treaties supersede
state law, even in areas that the federal government has previ-
ously left to states to regulate. 93 A state statute denying na-
tionals of other countries specific rights granted to them under
international treaties would be invalid. For example, in
Havenstein v. Lynham,94 a provision of a treaty between the
United States and the Swiss confederation was sufficient to
override conflicting provisions in a Virginia alien land law that
prohibited an intestate disposition to aliens who had no inten-
tion of becoming residents of Virginia.95
The United States is currently a party to numerous bilat-
eral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN).96 Many of these treaties include provisions that grant
land ownership rights to citizens and business entities of the
nation that is the treaty partner.97 Additionally, some FCN
treaties extend land ownership rights to certain countries with
most-favored-nation (MFN) status.9 MFN status allows the
signatory equivalent rights to those extended in treaties with
all other MFN treaty signatories. Because some FCN treaties
extend land ownership rights to countries with MFN status, it
follows that all other MFN treaty partners enjoy the same land
ownership rights. However, FCN treaties do little to restrict
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
93. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812)
(establishing supremacy of a United States-Great Britain treaty over a Virginia
law that expropriated land held by loyalist); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (treaty between the United States and Great Britain that protected migrato-
ry birds found to supersede state law conflicting with the treaty.).
94. 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
95. Id. See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Nielson v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 47 (1929); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133
U.S. 258 (1890).
96. See Morrison, supra note 15, at nn.225-34 (providing an extensive list of
FCN treaties).
97. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Nether-
lands, March 27, 1956, U.S.-Neth., art. IX, 1, 8 U.S.T. 2042, 2056 [hereinafter
FCN-Netherlands].
98. See FCN-Netherlands, supra note 97.
19931 229
BROOK. J. INTL L.
the most prohibitive alien land laws. As discussed earlier,99
the most prohibitive alien land laws are directed at agricultur-
al land. The FCN treaties that grant land ownership rights,
specifically reserve the right to limit the extent to which aliens
may exploit the land or other natural resources."'o An exam-
ple of the FCN treaties' limitation is found in Lehndorff Gene-
va Inc. v. Warren,'' in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the state's alien land law °2 did not conflict with an
FCN treaty with West Germany because the treaty reserved
the right to limit the exploitation of land and the plaintiffs in-
tended to use the land for agricultural purposes.' Thus,
while the Supremacy Clause prohibits the states from applying
alien land laws to foreign entities protected by FCN treaties,
where the law does not relate to the exploitation of land, it
does not interfere with the enforcement of the more restrictive
laws relating to the exploitation of land. °4
B. Federal Government's Power to Regulate Land Transactions
and the Potential Pre-emption of State Laws
The federal government also has the power to regulate
land transactions. This includes the power to impose alien land
laws upon the states. This authority rests on the commerce
power,' 5 foreign affairs power' and, to a limited extent,
on the taxing power.' °7 Congress has exercised this authority
99. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., FCN-Netherlands, supra note 97, art. VII, 1 2.
101. 246 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1976).
102. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 710.02 (West Supp. 1989) (prohibiting nonresident aliens
and foreign corporations from acquiring more than 640 acres of land).
103. Lehndorff, 246 N.W. 2d 815, 818-19. Note also that a FCN treaty that
confficts with a state law does not invalidate the law completely; rather, the state
law will not apply to the entity protected by the treaty.
104. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text describing the nature of
alien land laws.
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. The foreign affairs power is a combination of Congress's powers to provide
for a common defense, declare war and raise armies, regulate foreign commerce
and maritime activities, impose duties, and establish a uniform naturalization law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
The President is given the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassa-
dors (subject to legislative advice and consent), and to serve as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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a number of times as will be briefly discussed below.' How-
ever, before discussing the specific federal statutes, the ques-
tion that must be addressed with respect to federal laws that
regulate land transactions involving aliens is whether they
pre-empt the state laws in the same area. Whether a state law
is pre-empted is an issue of congressional intent."9 Several
Supreme Court decisions indicate that Congress will be
deemed to have pre-empted a field only where either its intent
is unmistakable, or "the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion.""0 In determining congressional
intent when Congress has not expressly manifested one, the
Court has articulated a number of factors to be considered: (1)
the pervasiveness of the federal scheme, (2) the need for uni-
formity, and (3) the danger of conflict between state laws and
the administration of the federal program."' Additionally, if
an area is traditionally left to state control the Court is less
likely to find that the state laws have been pre-empted."' On
the other hand, it has been pointed out that "if the field is one
that is traditionally deemed 'national' the Court is more vigi-
lant in striking down state incursions into subjects that Con-
gress may have reserved to itself.""'
Pursuant to the foreign affairs power, the federal govern-
ment has enacted two regulations that pertain to alien owner-
ship of land. The first is the Alien Property Custodian Regula-
tions,". which was promulgated under authority of the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act (TEA).V " It provides that the proper-
ty of enemy aliens shall vest in a federal official in time of de-
108. See infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
109. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.4, at
314 (4th ed. 1991).
110. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
111. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-10 (1956); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).
112. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[Iln a
field which the States have traditionally occupied . . . we start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the state [are] not to be [ousted] by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
113. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 500 (2nd
ed. 1988). See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (the enforcement of
Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act was preempted by the federal Alien Registra-
tion Act because of the important national interest in regulating aliens and more
generally, in governing foreign affairs).
114. 26 C.F.R. § 303.1; 28 C.F.R. § 167; 31 C.F.R §§ 520.101, 520.102 (1992).
115. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1988).
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clared war. The second is the Foreign Asset Control Regula-
tion,".. which was also promulgated under the TEA. It de-
clares that all property transactions by aliens of listed nations
require prior approval and clearance from the Treasury De-
partment."
7
It seems fairly clear that the regulations enacted pursuant
to the foreign affairs power do not pre-empt alien land laws.
First, Congress has not expressly manifested an intent to pre-
empt state legislation."' Second, the regulation is not perva-
sive. It only concerns a minuscule amount of property-the
property of aliens of a few select countries" and the proper-
ty of enemy aliens in time of declared war.2 Lastly, the reg-
ulations do not raise questions of uniformity or pose any risk
of conflict with state laws.'
The Commerce Clause is a second source of power from
which Congress has enacted statutes that pertain to alien
ownership of land. The Supreme Court has identified three
broad areas that the government can regulate based on the
Commerce Clause. "First, the use of channels of interstate or
foreign commerce. . . second, protection of the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce... [and] third, those activities
affecting commerce." 22 Foreign investment in real property
clearly falls within the third category." Under the "affecting
commerce""24 rationale, the Court has upheld federal regu-
lation of a wide range of extremely local intrastate activity that
116. 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1992).
117. See Morrison, supra note 15, at nn.200-08 and accompanying text for a
more detailed discussion of these regulations.
118. Morrison, supra note 15, at 655.
119. The only countries currently listed are North Korea, Cambodia, and Viet-
nam. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1992).
120. This regulation is not currently applicable.
121. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 653-56 for a detailed discussion about the
lack of preemptive effect these federal laws have.
122. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1970).
123. See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of
whether foreign investment in real property constitutes commerce).
124. The Supreme Court first articulated the "affecting commerce" rationale in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act and the labor board's order against an employer's
unfair interference with union activities, by construing the commerce clause to
permit federal regulation of anything having a substantial effect upon interstate
commerce regardless of its source. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (Court held that the commerce clause power did not permit the Congress to
regulate labor conditions).
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has traditionally been governed by state law.'25
Federal regulation of foreign real estate investment has
been traditionally limited to land holdings that are already
under federal control. These laws regulated foreign ownership
of geothermal steam resources,'26 homesteads 2 and graz-
ing land.2 ' Since 1976, however, the federal government has
enacted two statutes pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and
one pursuant to the taxing power,'29 that regulate foreign in-
vestment in real estate not under federal control.
The AFIDA"30 was enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause power. The law requires foreign persons who acquire or
transfer any interest in United States agricultural land to
submit a report to the Secretary of Agriculture. 3' A copy of
the report is sent to the state where the land is located. The
legislative history of AFIDA articulates a need for further
information and data collection regarding the extent and ef-
fects of foreign ownership of United States farmland.132 It is
125. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Court upheld federal quotas
on amount of grain that could be produced, even when quota applied to grain
consumed on the farm where it was raised, based on the "cumulative effect" of
many farmers growing wheat for home consumption); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (in both cases the Court upheld Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which
bans discrimination in places of public accommodation, thus regulating the activi-
ties of local establishments); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Court
upheld a federal anti-loan-sharking provision of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act as applied to an individual whose loan-sharking activities occurred entirely
within one state).
126. 30 U.S.C. § 1015 (1988).
127. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1988) repealed by Pub. L. 94-579, title VII, § 702, 90
Stat. 2787.
128. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1988).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
130. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988). See David A. Richards, Reporting and Dis-
closure Requirements for the Foreign Investor in U.S. Real Estate, 25 REAL PROP.
& T. J. 217, 220 (1990) (provides a detailed description of the statute, its history,
and its compliance requirements).
131. The report must include the legal name and address of the person holding
the interest, the country of his or her citizenship, the nature of the legal entity (if
not a person or a government), the country in which the entity is organized, and
the entity's principal place of business. The report must also include the type of
interest held, the legal description of and consideration paid for the land, the
purposes or intended purposes for its use, information about the transferee if it is
the foreign party, and any other information the Secretary of Agriculture may
require. 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1988).
132. H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2914:
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not intended to erect foreign investment barriers and is consis-
tent with the longstanding government policy of preserving the
free flow of transnational investment capital. 33
The International Investment and Trade in Services Sur-
vey Act of 1976 (IITSSA)'34 was passed pursuant to the com-
merce power and is administered by the Commerce Depart-
ment. It requires the filing of reports with respect to the direct
or indirect acquisition by a foreign person of a voting interest
of ten percent or more in a United States business enterprise,
including real estate.' 5 Unlike AFIDA reports, only aggre-
gate data is available to the states and the public. Raw data
collected pursuant to IITSSA is not available and is closely
guarded.16 Like AFIDA, IITSSA is not intended to prohibit
or discourage foreign investment; the federal intent is merely
to make sure that the information is available for study so that
any impact foreign investment may have can be deter-
mined. 3 '
"[Tihe lack of any solid, reliable data on foreign investment in U.S. agri-
cultural land makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine if such
investment does, in fact, pose a threat to the United States as a whole,
or to the family farms and rural communities in this country. Clearly,
such information [is] needed before a reasonable, responsible analysis of
the situation can be made."
Id. at 2920.
Other members of Congress wanted to enact stricter federal regulations
with respect to foreign investment in agricultural land. They cited a number of
potential threats, including: the danger to local economies from absentee-owned
farms, danger to soil conservation programs, foreign influence on production and
marketing of specialized crops, and the potential for higher food prices. See H.R.
REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 2914,
2917.
133. See Julius L. Katz, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States - Ad-
vantages and Barriers, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INTIL L. 473, 481-82 (1979).
134. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988) (amended 1990). See Richards, supra note
130, at 223 (providing a detailed description of the statute, its history, and its
compliance requirements).
135. IITSSA did not apply to real estate until after AFIDA was passed and the
reporting forms were first published in June 1979. See Richards, supra note 130,
at 223.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 3104(c). It has been suggested that "this may reflect congres-
sional recognition that agricultural assets profoundly implicate national sovereignty
concerns and [therefore] warrant closer [state] monitoring." See Cheryl Tate, Note,
The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investment, 99 YALE
L.J. 2023, 2027 (1990).
137. See 22 U.S.C. § 3101(c) ("Nothing in this act is intended to restrain or
deter foreign investment in the United States . . ").
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The most recent federal regulation pertaining to foreign
investment in United States real estate is the Foreign Invest-
ment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA). 8 FIRPTA
eliminates a long-standing tax advantage for foreign investors
in United States real estate. Before its enactment, gains from
the disposition of real property by nonresident aliens or foreign
corporations had to be "effectively connected" to a United
States trade or business to be subject to United States taxa-
tion.'39 Under this requirement, many real estate transac-
tions conducted from abroad escaped taxation. 4 ' FIRPTA
places all income from the disposition of United States real
property interests 4' under the taxing power of the federal
government. FIRPTA essentially treats nonresident aliens or
foreign corporations as if they were engaged in trade or busi-
ness within the United States, thus all the profit from United
States land sales are considered a taxable source of income
within the United States.
FIRPTA, like AFIDA and IITSSA, is not intended to dis-
courage or restrict foreign investors. Its purpose is to put for-
eigners on the same footing as United States citizens and to
generate revenue for the federal government.
It does not appear that AFIDA, IITSSA, or FIRPTA, either
individually or as a group, pre-empt the state's alien land laws.
First, Congress did not manifestly express an intention to pre-
empt existing state laws in the area. Second, it does not ap-
pear that Congress regulated so pervasively as to conclude that
it left no room for state action. AFIDA and IITSSA act only as
an information gathering mechanisms and not as actual regu-
latory restrictions. FIRPTA is a revenue generating statute
that is only tangentially related to the regulation of alien land-
holding. Third, the three statutes do not evince a congressional
intent that the area requires uniform regulation, though the
138. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(5), 897, 6039C, 6652(f) (1988).
139. 26 U.S.C. §§ 871(a)(2), 882(a)(1), 864(c) (1988); See Patricia A. Matnias,
Note, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate: Congress Acts to Reduce
Incentives, 7 INTL TRADE L.J. 150, 151 (1981-82).
140. Id. at 151-52.
141. U.S. real property interest includes any interest in mines, wells, or other
natural resources located in the United States or the Virgin Islands. 26 U.S.C. §
897(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
142. See William D. Metzger, Foreign Investors Real Property Tax Act: Histor-
ical Perspective and Critical Evaluation, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 161, 163 (1982).
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question of uniform regulation has been vigorously debat-
ed. 43 Fourth, it does not appear that the state laws which
generally impose prohibitions, restrictions or reporting require-
ments on alien ownership of real property pose a danger of
conflicting with the information gathering or tax collecting
required by the federal statutes. Finally, because the regula-
tion of land ownership is an area traditionally controlled by
states,' the Court may require an even clearer indication
that the Congress intended to pre-empt the field.
IV. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Constitutional Framework Established to Analyze State
Statutes that Burden Interstate Commerce
The Constitution specifically grants Congress the power
"[o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States . .. ."" Although the Commerce Clause is an
affirmative grant of power to Congress, courts interpret its
dormant powers or "negative implications"'46 to strike down
state laws that interfere with the free flow of interstate or
foreign commerce even when Congress has not acted. If a court
invalidates a state law on the grounds that it unconstitutional-
ly interferes with the free flow of commerce, Congress is free to
pass legislation that gives the state the power to regulate in
the way the court found unconstitutional. Congress is not over-
turning the court, it is merely stating its position as to how it
chooses to regulate.4 The Supreme Court recognized early
on, however, that States have concurrent power to regulate
143. See Fretchter, supra note 10, at 178 (arguing that uniform federal legis-
lation governing alien land ownership would be injurious to state sovereignty,
cumbersome and impractical to implement, and unable to address the legitimate
and diverse concerns of the several states). See Starrels, supra note 8, at 177-78
(arguing that the states should adopt uniform federal regulations concerning alien
land ownership because the current system is "ineffective and can operate as an
unnecessary disincentive to investment activity that in many situations could be
beneficial").
144. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
146. See TRIBE, supra note 113, § 6-2, at 403.
147. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (Congress
may "redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce . . . [by] per-
mit[ting] the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise
not be permissible.").
236 [V7ol. XX: I
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
interstate commerce provided that national uniformity is not
required and the law does not conflict with federal legisla-
tion. 4 ' In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,49 the Supreme
Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required ships in
interstate or foreign commerce to use local pilots when navi-
gating in state waters. The Court distinguished between those
areas of commerce that "are in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, [and] may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress" 50 and those areas where 'local ne-
cessities"'5 ' demand diverse regulations. Since Cooley, the
Court has attempted to balance the local needs of the states
and the overriding national requirement of freedom from inter-
ference in interstate and foreign commerce.
When analyzing state laws that may unlawfully burden
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between "outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on
the free flow of trade."5 2 Protectionist legislation that facially
discriminates against out-of-staters is subject to a "Virtually
per se rule of invalidity."'53 Legislation that evenhandedly
impacts on both those in-state and out-of-state may survive
constitutional scrutiny.5 4 However, statutes that are facially
neutral, but in their practical applications have a discriminato-
ry effect, will trigger a heightened scrutiny.'55 I n P i k e v.
Bruce Church, Inc.," 6 the Court articulated the balancing
test to be used when legislation is evenhanded:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest... it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
148. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 319.
151. Id.
152. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
153. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
154. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Minneso-
ta v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
155. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977). See infra note 157 (discussing the facts in Hunt).
156. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will...
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.5 7
Where state legislation is facially discriminatory, the Su-
preme Court has set forth a per se rule of invalidity. In Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey,5 s the Court struck down a New Jer-
sey law that prohibited the importing of solid or liquid waste
into the state. The opinion declined to decide whether the main
purpose of the law was environmental, as New Jersey claimed,
or economic protectionism, as the plaintiffs claimed, holding
that the purpose was not constitutionally relevant. Justice
Stewart, writing for the 7-2 majority stated that:
[Whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its
face and in its plain effect, [the statute] violates this prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination.'59
157. Id. at 142. In Pike, the Court struck down an Arizona law requiring local
fruit growers to pack their high-quality fruit locally in the interest of promoting
the reputation of Arizona products. Although the state action in Pike advanced an
admittedly legitimate local interest, it imposed a clearly excessive burden on com-
merce by requiring business operations to be performed in Arizona that could
more efficiently be performed out of state.
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977), the Court struck down a facially neutral North Carolina statute that had a
discriminatory effect and economic protectionist motive. The statute raised the cost
of marketing Washington apples and stripped away Washington growers' competi-
tive advantage while leaving local growers unaffected. The Court held that when a
discriminatory effect is found, the burden of proof in the Pike balancing test falls
on the state, which must "justify [the statute] both in terms of the local bene-
fits . . . and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 353.
158. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
159. Id. at 626-27.
In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980), the Court
may have backed off a little from the per se rule. Yet the Court did strike down
a Florida law that prevented an out-of-state bank or bank holding company from
owning an in-state investment advisory firm. While the strong language the Court
used in condemning the law indicated that the Justices could have easily found
the law per se invalid, they instead conducted a balancing analysis. The Court
found that the state's purported objectives may have been legitimate, but they did
not justify the "heavily disproportionate burden" the statute placed on out-of-state
banks. Id. at 43. Additionally, the Court thought there were nondiscriminatory
19931 DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 239
The Supreme Court has identified one exception to the per se
rule for facial discrimination. If the state can show that the fa-
cially discriminatory barrier to out-of-state goods is motivated
by bona fide health or safety concerns that cannot be adequate-
ly addressed by a nondiscriminatory alternative, the Court will
uphold the law based on the state's traditional police pow-
ers. 1
60
Recently the Supreme Court put into question the continu-
ing viability of the Pike balancing test for nondiscriminatory
laws though reaffirmed the view that discriminatory laws are
the primary focus of dormant commerce clause scrutiny. In
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,6' the Court over-
turned a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision and upheld
an Indiana anti-takeover law against challenges based on pre-
emption162 and the dormant commerce clause. The Indiana
law was neutral on its face, but in its practical effect would
apply most often to out-of-state entities.16' The important as-
pect of the Court's opinion in CTS, for the purpose of this
Note's dormant commerce clause discussion, is the methodol-
ogy the Court uses to arrive at its decision. First, the Court
stated that "[tihe principle objects of dormant commerce clause
alternatives. Id.
160. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (Maine imposed a total ban on
the importation of out-of-state bait fish on the grounds that the out-of-state fish
contained parasites that threatened their own fish, which were not infested. The
Court upheld the ban because a nondiscriminatory alternative did not exist.).
161. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
162. The lower courts held that the Indiana anti-takeover law was preempted
by the Williams Act, which governs certain aspects of hostile corporate stock ten-
der offers. Id. at 84.
163. The Court rejected Dynamics argument that the statute is discriminatory
because it would apply most often to out-of-state entities. The Court stated: "[tihe
fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does
not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." Id.
at 88 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978); Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981)). Furthermore, they
rejected the Court of Appeal's reasoning that even if the law was not discriminato-
ry it violated the dormant commerce clause because of its potential to hinder ten-
der offers, thereby burdening interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reasoned
that "the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce
Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regula-
tion of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law . . . . By prohibiting certain transactions, and regulating others, such laws
necessarily affect certain aspects of interstate commerce." Id. at 89-90.
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scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate com-
merce.""6 4  After concluding that the statute regulated
evenhandedly, the Court stated that statutes that may subject
activities to inconsistent regulations in different states are also
a main focus of dormant commerce clause limitations.165 The
Court found that "the Indiana Act poses no such problem."
16
The Court did not follow-up the above analysis with the Pike
balancing test as one might expect, and therefore, there is
some question as to the tests continuing viability. Thus, if a
statute is found to be either facially discriminatory, or that it
will subject an activity to inconsistent regulations, then the
law is invalid and the court should not attempt to balance the
state and federal interests.'67  If a statute regulates
evenhandedly, it is currently in question whether the Court
will balance the state and federal interests.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to Foreign
Commerce
This Note argues that state laws restricting foreigners
from owning real property violate the dormant commerce
clause. In the past, there has been some debate about whether
state laws that interfere with foreign commerce are subject to
the same dormant commerce clause analysis as state laws that
interfere with interstate commerce. 6 ' However, when one
considers the difference in the underlying purpose between the
two clauses it becomes clear why the test is not identical. The
164. CTS, 481 U.S. at 87 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1975); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980)).
165. Id. at 88. (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
166. Id. at 89.
167. See Campeau Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735,
738 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (Court interprets the CTS Court's dormant commerce clause
methodology to be, "[only if the state law is not invalid according to the above
criteria [nondiscriminatory and no risk of inconsistent regulations] must the court
consider if the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the putative local benefits
of the regulations.").
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, stated that the only things that the
Court should consider are: (1) if the law "discriminates against interstate com-
merce" and (2) "if it creates an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by
different States." And that the Pike balancing test should be undertaken rarely if
at all. CTS, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. See Huizinga, supra note 27, at 269 n.87.
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interstate Commerce Clause was designed "to avoid the ten-
dencies toward economic Balkanization that plagued relations
among the colonies and later among the states under the Arti-
cles of Confederation."'69 In contrast, the foreign Commerce
Clause70 appears to have been included in the constitution
because of the framers' deep concern about the need for a uni-
form national policy with respect to foreign trade and foreign
relations. 7'
There are far fewer dormant commerce clause cases con-
cerning foreign commerce, thus, the Supreme Court has not
had the same opportunity to develop as structured an analysis
to confront them. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles"'2
is the leading case that articulates the Court's reasons why the
two clauses do not receive the same scrutiny and why interfer-
ences in foreign commerce should receive greater scrutiny. 73
The Court, in Japan Line, struck down a California ad
valorem property tax, as applied to cargo containers used ex-
clusively in foreign commerce, as violative of the dormant com-
merce clause. First, the Court expressly rejected the argument
that the "Commerce Clause analysis is identical, regardless of
whether interstate or foreign commerce is involved."74 Jus-
tice Blackmun writing for the 8 to 1 majority stated that,
"[wihen construing Congress' power to 'regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional inquiry
169. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
170. The term "foreign Commerce Clause" refers to the part of the Commerce
Clause that states: "Congress shall have the power to . . . regulate commerce with
foreign nations . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
171. It is difficult to say with certainty what the Framers' intention was with
respect to the foreign commerce clause because there was little or no disagreement
about its inclusion in the Constitution. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause
in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV.
432, 444-45 (1941); E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMIERCE
CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1898).
172. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
173. There are other cases that involve foreign commerce where the Court has
suggested that the regulation of foreign commerce is a function entrusted solely to
the federal government. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States,
289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1932) ("It is an essential attribute of the power [to regulate
foreign commerce] that it is exclusive and plenary. As an exclusive power, its
exercise may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to any extent by state action.");
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875) (the imposition of bur-
densome "conditions on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations
must of necessity be national in. . . character").
174. 441 U.S. at 446.
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is required."'75 The Court then turned to a four part test 17 6
used to determine whether a state tax on interstate commerce
is constitutional. The Court held that a state tax on the instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce must be scrutinized according
to two additional considerations--"the enhanced risk of multi-
ple taxation"7 ' and the possibility that a "state tax on the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essen-
tial."7" The Court gives three reasons why greater scrutiny is
necessary when taxing instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
First, "[foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national
concern"; 7 ' second, "there is evidence that the Founders in-
tended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be...
greater"80 than the scope of the interstate commerce power;
and third, it was "the Framers' overriding concern that 'the
Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulat-
ing commercial relations with foreign governments." 18' The
Court concluded that the ad valorem tax would risk retaliation
against the entire nation and "prevent[U this Nation from
speaking with one voice in regulating foreign commerce."
82
The dormant commerce clause test for state taxation8 3
that may unconstitutionally interfere with foreign commerce is
somewhat different than the dormant commerce clause test for
state regulations that may interfere with foreign commerce.
Yet the same principles that underlie the heightened scrutiny
for taxation of foreign commerce, discussed in Japan Line,
have been applied to state regulation of foreign commerce. For
example, in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
175. Id.
176. A state tax does not violate the dormant commerce clause provided it "is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly relat-
ed to the services provided by the State." Id. at 444-45 (quoting Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
177. Id. at 446.
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976)).
182. Japan Line 434 U.S. at 450-51.
183. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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Wunnicke,' 4 the Court invalidated an Alaska law that re-
quired buyers of timber from state-owned land to partially
process the timber inside Alaska before exporting it."5 After
rejecting the state's argument that the law was valid under the
"market participant""6 exception, Justice White, writing for
the plurality, stated:
Because of the protectionist nature of... [the law] and the
burden on commerce resulting therefrom, we conclude that it
falls within the rule of virtual per se invalidity of laws that
"bloc[k] the flow of interstate commerce at a State's bor-
ders"'" . . . We are buttressed in our conclusion that the
restriction is invalid by the fact that foreign commerce is
burdened by the restriction. It is a well-accepted rule that
state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected
to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny. It is crucial to the
efficient execution of the Nation's foreign policy that "the
Federal Government... speak with one voice when regulat-
ing commercial relations with foreign governments.""s
Thus, in conformity with Japan Line, the court in Wunnicke
applied a heightened scrutiny to a state regulation that inter-
fered with foreign commerce.
It appears that the courts will apply the per se rule of
invalidity for facially discriminatory laws, which was laid down
by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,189 an
interstate commerce case, to laws that discriminate against
foreign commerce. In Campeau Corp. v. Federated Department
184. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
185. This case concerns foreign commerce since there is virtually no interstate
market in Alaska timber because of the high shipping costs associated with ship-
ment between American ports. Consequently, over 90% of Alaska timber is export-
ed to Japan. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 86 n.4.
186. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp, 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Reeves
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (When the state is acting as a buyer or seller, in
other words, as a "market participant," the dormant commerce clause places no
limitation on its activities.).
187. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 100 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)) (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 100 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)
and citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979)) (cita-
tions omitted).
189. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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Stores,190 a district court struck down an Ohio antitakeover
statute. This case is particularly relevant to alien land laws
because it concerns foreign ownership and investment in assets
located in the United States. The law severely restricted for-
eign corporations from acquiring control of businesses with
substantial interests in Ohio. The implicit reasoning of the
court was that if states are prohibited from facially discrimi-
nating against interstate commerce, and Japan Line stands for
the proposition that foreign commerce receives even greater
scrutiny then interstate commerce, then facial discrimination
against foreign commerce is certainly also invalid. 9' The
court went on to find that the law would also increase the risk
that a foreign corporation would be subject to inconsistent
regulations from different states.
Thus, the Supreme Court's approach to state regulations
that interfere with foreign commerce would likely be to incor-
porate the heightened scrutiny discussed in Japan Line9' in-
to the framework established to analyze state laws that inter-
fere with interstate commerce.' In other words, facially neu-
tral laws will be analyzed under the Pike balancing test,
194
and the federal interest in "speaking with one voice" with re-
190. 679 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
191. See Campeau, 679 F. Supp. at 738. ("The Commerce Clause not only pro-
hibits states from discriminating against trade with other states within the United
States, it prohibits states from discriminating against trade with foreign coun-
tries."). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 236
(1972) (Henkin noted that the Court would probably apply the same dormant
commerce clause standard developed for interstate commerce to foreign commerce).
In the past the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that discriminate
against foreign commerce, though the cases preceded the modem dormant com-
merce clause analysis. For example, in Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375
(1939), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a Florida statute imposing large
inspection fees on cement imported from foreign countries while similar state prod-
ucts were not subject to such charges. The state argued that the inspection of
foreign cement was necessary for the public safety. The court rejected this conten-
tion and stated that "discrimination against foreign commerce by the onerous ex-
traction of an inspection fee," admittedly designed to curh foreign competition, was
an unconstitutional assumption of national power by the state. Furthermore, the
Court stated that it would not be "easy to imagine a statute more clearly designed
to circumvent what the Commerce Clause forbids." Id. at 380.81.
192. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
193. This assumes that the Supreme Court would agree with the district
court's analysis in Campeau. This is arguably a safe assumption considering the
Court's decision in Hale v. Bimco, 306 U.S. 75 (1939), discussed supra note 191,
and the cases cited in supra note 173.
194. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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gard to foreign commerce will be factored into the equation,
thus making it more difficult for a state's interest to outweigh
the national interest. This depends on whether CTS marked
the end of the use of the balancing tests. When the law is
facially discriminatory, as was the case in Campeau,'95 the
court will apply the per se rule of invalidity without actually
reaching the question of whether the country needs to "speak
with one voice."
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to Alien Land
Laws
1. Threshold Question: Is Foreign Investment in Real
Property Foreign Commerce?
A threshold question in determining whether state laws
that restrict foreign investment in real property located in the
United States violate the dormant commerce clause is whether
foreign investment in land constitutes foreign commerce, or at
least has a significant effect on foreign commerce. Some have
argued that land ownership is a matter of purely local concern
because real estate is fixed within the several states and thus
outside the definition of commerce.'96 However, commerce
has been broadly defined to "comprehend every species of com-
mercial intercourse between the United States and foreign na-
tions""'97 that is at some stage extraterritorial.' The extra-
territorial aspect of foreign investment in United States real
property exists because foreign investment almost inevitably
includes the international flow of currency into this country,
and international banking operations to exchange foreign cur-
rencies and transmit funds to local property sellers. In addi-
tion, United States real estate brokers advertise local lands for
sale in foreign newspapers and engage the service of foreign
real estate brokers.'99 Thus, state regulations that restrict
foreign real estate investment do have a significant effect on
transactions that are extraterritorial in nature.
195. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
196. See Frechter, supra note 10, at 161-65.
197. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
198. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573 (1852).
199. See Huizinga, supra note 27, at 263.
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However, it has been argued that the extraterritorial as-
pect of foreign investment in United States real property is
merely incidental to the transaction. Furthermore, it is argued
that "[sluch incidents alone cannot give birth to [foreign com-
merce or] a transaction that 'affects' foreign commerce when
the transaction would otherwise be beyond the purview of the
Commerce Clause.""0 This argument ignores the broad defi-
nition the courts have consistently given to interstate and for-
eign commerce,2' and the variety of local activities that Con-
gress has regulated under the Commerce power, including real
property transactions.2 2 Most importantly, it ignores a line of
decisions that have held state laws are properly analyzed un-
der the dormant commerce clause if Congress has concurrently
regulated that area. Such is the case with respect to foreign
investment in United States real property.
When there are concurrent federal and state regulations,
two Supreme Court cases make clear that the state regulations
are subject to dormant commerce clause scrutiny. In Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey,"3 the Supreme Court addressed the
lower court's holding that there are two definitions of com-
merce for constitutional purposes---"'a very sweeping concept'
of commerce,"2. 4 when the federal government bases its regu-
latory power on it, and a "much more confined... reach" when
relied on by the Court "to strike down or restrict state legisla-
tion."2 5 The Supreme Court completely rejected this notion of
a dual definition and held that if Congress has the power to
regulate an activity pursuant to its commerce power, then
"[sitates are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they
restrict [that activity]. " '2
The Court reaffirmed its reasoning in a case where it faced
a slightly different version of this argument. In Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers Inc., °7 the appellant, and the amici
supporting its position, argued that the statute, which restrict-
200. See Frechter, supra note 10, at 164.
201. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
203. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
204. Id. at 621 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 348 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J.
1978)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 622-23.
207. 447 U.S. 27 (1980). See supra note 159 (discussing the facts of Lewis).
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ed ownership of investment advisory businesses, "affects only
matters of local character that have insufficient interstate
attributes to bring federal constitutional limitations into
play."208 The Court agreed that bank and financial activities
are of "profound local concern"209 and historically have been
regulated by the states. However, the Court reasoned that
banking and finance also have important interstate attributes
that have justified extensive federal regulation in this area.
Citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey,1° the Court concluded
that "the same interstate attributes that establish Congress'
power to regulate commerce also support constitutional limita-
tions on the powers of the States."21'
The conclusion one can draw from these decisions is that
the Court will defer to congressional determinations about
what constitutes commerce or what has a significant impact on
commerce when deciding if the dormant commerce clause plac-
es a limit on state laws.212
As discussed earlier, pursuant to its commerce power,
Congress has enacted two statutes that regulate foreign in-
vestment in United States real estate: AFIDA2  and
IITSSA2 4. Thus, because Congress has decided to regulate
the ownership of land by foreigners,"5 there can be little
doubt that the dormant commerce clause is a potential limi-
tation on state laws that restrict foreign ownership of real
property.
208. Id. at 37.
209. Id. at 38.
210. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
211. 447 U.S. at 39.
212. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964), it has generally deferred to congressional decisions provided that there
is any rational basis upon which Congress could have found some relation between
its regulation and interstate commerce.
213. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988). See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text.
214. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988) (amended 1990). See supra notes 134-37
and accompanying text.
215. While AFIDA and IITSSA do not regulate ownership in the sense that
they do not specify who can or cannot own land, they do impose conditions on
real property transactions that lead to ownership, thus indirectly regulating owner-
ship.
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2. Application of the Dormant Commerce Clause Test to Alien
Land Laws
State laws that restrict or prohibit foreign ownership of
real property in the United States are per se invalid under the
dormant commerce clause test described in this Note. The laws
are facially discriminatory, 16 and in some states their main
aim is economic protectionism.21 Based on the Supreme
Court's application of the interstate dormant commerce clause
test as applied to foreign commerce in Wunnicke,"' and the
per se rule of invalidity applied to facial discrimination against
foreign commerce in Campeau,219 the facially discriminatory
character of alien land laws makes them per se invalid. The
fact that some laws have protectionist motives only adds
strength to this argument.
It has been argued that the country need not "speak with
one voice" with respect to alien ownership of United States
real property. ° Even if one accepts this position, under the
dormant commerce clause test as applied to state interference
with foreign commerce, the question about the "need to speak
with one voice" is never reached. Once it is determined that
the law is facially discriminatory, it violates the per se rule,
thereby eliminating the need for further inquiry.
It has also been suggested that alien land laws do not
violate the dormant commerce clause because the federal gov-
ernment seems to have implicitly recognized the state's power
to limit foreign ownership of real property in several Treaties
of Friendship.' For example, a United States treaty with
Netherlands grants "rights in real property permitted by the
applicable laws of the States . ,.,222 Thus one could argue
216. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (describing the nature of the
current laws).
217. See Fisch, supra note 15, at 413 (noting that one of the main reasons
Missouri enacted its current alien land laws was to eliminate foreign competition
for local farmland).
218. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
220. See Frechter, supra note 10, at 178 (arguing that uniform federal legis-
lation governing alien land ownership would be injurious to state sovereignty,
cumbersome and impractical to implement, and unable to address the legitimate
and diverse concerns of the several states).
221. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 652.
222. See FCN-Netherlands, supra note 97, art. IX, para. 1(b), 8 U.S.T. at 2056.
A detailed discussion about treaty provisions relating to real property ownership is
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that alien land laws are removed from dormant commerce
clause scrutiny because Congress has not been silent about the
regulation of foreign commerce in this area and has approved
of the state's power to regulate foreign ownership of land.
The Supreme Court, however, has not allowed the states
to escape dormant commerce clause scrutiny so easily. In
Wunnicke," the Court discussed the only two ways that
state regulations can escape the reach of the dormant com-
merce clause. The first is the "market participant" excep-
tion,224 which does not apply to alien land laws unless state
owned land is involved. The second is if Congress has expressly
stated its position and its intent to remove the state law "from
the reach of the dormant commerce clause [is] unmistakably
clear .... ,,225
Under the "express statement" requirement, the Court has
struck down numerous state statutes that regulated areas
where congressional legislation demonstrated Congress' defer-
ence to state laws. For example, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,
226
the Court struck down a state law that imposed burdens on
interstate commerce in ground water. The Court rejected the
state's argument that Congress had authorized the interfer-
provided in Morrison, supra note 15, at 656-63; Fisch, supra note 15, at 421-23.
223. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
224. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
225. 467 U.S. at 91. The court in Wunnicke explained the underlying reason for
the "express statement" requirement:
[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls princi-
pally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legis-
lation where it affects adversely some interests within the state . .. ."
On the other hand, when Congress acts, all segments of the country are
represented and there is significantly less danger that one State will be
in a position to exploit others. Furthermore, if a State is in such a posi-
tion, the decision to allow it is a collective one. A rule requiring a clear
expression of approval by Congress ensures that there is, in fact, such a
collective decision and reduces significantly the risk that unrepresented
interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce .... The
need for affirmative approval is heightened by the fact that Alaska's
policy has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation's borders. The
need for a consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive
responsibility of the Federal Government, enhances the necessity that
congressional authorization not be lightly implied.
Id. at 92 & n.7 (quoting South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1958)).
226. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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ence, despite thirty-seven federal statutes and a number of
interstate agreements that demonstrated Congress' deference
to state waterelaws. The Court noted that in cases where con-
gressional consent was found, there was an "express state-
ment" of an intent to insulate the state law from dormant
commerce clause attacks.227
Similarly, in New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire,"' the Court rejected the state's argument that its re-
striction on the flow of privately owned and produced electrici-
ty was authorized by the Federal Power Act which states: "[the
act] shall not... deprive a State or State Commission of its
lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydro-
electric energy which is transmitted across a State line."229
The Court stated that there was nothing in the legislative
history of the statute "evincing a Congressional intent 'to alter
the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce
Clause.' ,230
Finally, in Wunnicke, the Court rejected Alaska's claim
that its regulation of foreign commerce"' was exempt from
dormant commerce clause scrutiny because of a parallel federal
statute with similar goals. The Court stated that "[t]he fact
that the state policy in this case appears to be consistent with
federal policy.., is an insufficient indicium of congressional
intent.")
2
Based on the "express statement" requirement, it can
hardly be said that a short statement in a Treaty of Friendship
acknowledging the fact that state restrictions on landholding
exist, is an express statement "evincing a congressional intent
'to alter the limits of State power otherwise imposed by the
Commerce Clause.' 233 Furthermore, unlike the Alaska stat-
ute in Wunnicke where the state regulation was consistent
with federal policy, restrictions on foreign investments, such as
alien land laws, conflict with the federal policy of maintaining
a relatively unrestricted flow of foreign capital into the United
227. Id. at 960.
228. 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
229. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1988).
230. 455 U.S. at 341 (quoting United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cali-
fornia, 245 U.S. 295, 304 (1953)).
231. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
232. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 92.
233. New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 341.
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States.23 4
The treaty provision should be considered an acknowledg-
ment of the traditional role states have played in regulating
land ownership but this is not necessarily an approval of the
role or the laws. Nor is it an "express statement" of congressio-
nal intention to limit its power in any manner, including the
application of the dormant commerce clause to alien land laws
if they are challenged on that basis.
Another potential defense to a dormant commerce clause
challenge to alien land laws is that the laws fit into the health
and safety exception the Court articulated most recently in
Maine v. Taylor. 5 The states could argue that alien land
laws are a proper exercise of the state's police power to protect
the health and safety of their citizens. They could first argue
that absentee ownership of land by nonresident aliens can be
potentially detrimental to the community where the land is
located because they will not contribute economically or in a
civic manner to the community. 6
In response to this argument one could argue, first, that
there is no guarantee that United States citizens or resident
aliens will live in the community where the land is owned and
thus would also not contribute in any way to the community.
Second, both residents and nonresident would be required to
pay the same property taxes which is presumably the primary
revenue generated by land ownership. Third, no one is obli-
gated to engage in civic minded activity and thus nonresident
aliens should not be singled out for this reason. Fourth, while
the nonresident alien would not work or reside in the commu-
nity, there is no reason to believe that the land would not be
leased to a resident that would contribute to the community.
The second argument that could be advanced by states is
that nonresident aliens' ownership of agricultural land could
jeopardize the state's or nation's food supply because as non-
234. See Katz, supra note 133, at 481-82. See also supra notes 130-44 and
accompanying text (federal statutes in this area also indicate an open policy to-
ward foreign investment in real property).
235. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). See supra note 160 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
236. See Lehndorff Geneva v. Warren, 246 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Wis. 1974) (Wis-
consin justified its alien land law on this basis when defending against an equal
protection challenge). See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
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citizens and nonresidents they are more likely to make produc-
tion decisions based solely on profit maximization without
considering the state's or national interests. 237 Additionally, if
land is purchased for speculative reasons, it is possible that
the land may not be farmed at all.
In response it could be argued that there is little doubt
that profit maximization is the primary if not sole concern of
domestic farmers. In fact, corporations dominate many areas of
the agricultural industry.2 8 The boards of these corporations
have a duty to their shareholders to maximize profits. With
respect to land that is left fallow, it is just as likely that a
domestic speculator would decide not to farm the land. Fur-
thermore, the federal government pays out millions of dollars
each year in farm subsidies to induce farmers not to grow
certain crops. There seems to be little harm in a land owner
voluntarily not farming his land. If states are truly concerned
about the possibility that nonresident alien will not farm the
land, they could tax land that is not in production at a higher
rate than land that is farmed, thereby creating a nondiscrimi-
natory alternative that would provide an incentive to farm the
land and address the state's concern.
A third argument that states could advance is that foreign
land speculators pay such high prices for the land that local
farmers cannot compete with them. The response to this argu-
ment is simply that it is not a health or safety concern. It is a
state discriminating against competition by foreign investors to
the advantage of local investors. This form of economic protec-
tionism has never been tolerated. 9
V. CONCLUSION
This Note argues that the dormant commerce clause is the
strongest avenue of attack that a foreign investor interested in
challenging alien land laws can take. The Note reasons, first,
that alien land laws are subject to dormant commerce clause
limitations. Second, state laws that interfere with foreign com-
merce are reviewed under a higher standard of scrutiny than
237. See Huizinga, supra note 27, at 267; Fisch, supra note 15, at 413.
238. See Is the Family Farm Fading Away? Numbers Say No, CHI. TRB., Feb.
22, 1988, at C3.
239. See supra note 191 discussing Hale v. Bimco, 306 U.S. 75 (1939).
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state laws that interfere with interstate commerce. Third,
since state laws that facially discriminate against interstate
commerce are per se invalid, then state laws that interfere
with foreign commerce must also be invalid. Finally, since
alien land laws are facially discriminatory and burden foreign
commerce, they must be invalid.
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